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INTRODUCTION
On September 27, 2015, Ethan Haskell, a Content Manager at daily
fantasy sports-giant DraftKings, inadvertently published aggregate user
data regarding DraftKings’ biggest contest, the Millionaire Maker, before
some of the National Football League (NFL) games in that contest had
been played.1 The data released revealed which NFL athletes2 were the
most popular picks among DraftKings’ users for the contest.3 Such data is
normally not released until all of the games have started and all users’
lineups are finalized; viewing it early would provide someone participating
in the contest with a huge tactical advantage:4 someone like, perhaps
Haskell, who won $350,000 on a competing platform FanDuel for his
fantasy NFL predictions that same week.5 This story, which received wide
national news coverage with many allegations of “insider trading,” calls for
broader regulation of the daily fantasy sports industry, and the start of an
“insider trading” investigation by the New York Attorney General’s office.6
The fantasy sports industry has grown at a rapid rate, currently pulling
in over $400 million in revenues and a 14% participation rate of the U.S.
population.7 This paper will examine the often inadequate legal framework
1. Chris Grove, DraftKings Lineup Leak Rocks Daily Fantasy Sports Industry:
Questions and Answers, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Oct. 4, 2015),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/4548/draftkings-data-leak-faq/ [https://perma.cc/5B8K9L4K].
2. Throughout this paper, “athlete” will be used to describe members of actual
professional sports leagues while “participant” and “player” will be used to describe
members of fantasy sports leagues.
3. Joe Drape & Jacqueline Williams, Scandal Erupts in Unregulated World of
Fantasy
Sports,
N.Y.
(Oct.
5,
2015),
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/sports/fanduel-draftkings-fantasy-employees-betrivals.html [https://perma.cc/DP6L-FPA2].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See e.g., Grove, supra note 1 (explaining the DraftKings leak and what it means);
Drape & Williams, supra note 3; Darren Rovell, Commissioners Say Daily Fantasy Not
Akin
to
Gambling,
but
Needs
Regulation,
ESPN
(Oct.
27,2015),
http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/13983597/commishes-say-fantasy-not-gambling-needsregulation [https://perma.cc/D8X3-8ELD] (offering supporting opinions in favor of
regulation and against inappropriate use of information in fantasy sports); see also Curt
Nickisch, Fantasy Sports Industry Under Scrutiny After Insider Trading Allegations, NPR
(Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/09/447236543/fantasy-sports-industry-underscrutiny-after-insider-trading-allegations [https://perma.cc/9AQ3-SB9S] (discussing the
DraftKings leak and filings by fans of a federal class-action lawsuit alleging fraud).
7. Industry Demographics, FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, http://fsta.site-
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within which fantasy sports operate and the very real liabilities to which
millions of fantasy sports fans and service providers are currently exposed.
Part I provides an overview of Fantasy Sports. Part II describes the
ultimately failed insider trading investigation. Part III analyzes U.S.
gambling regulation, focusing on the current litigation taking place
between the New York Attorney General and daily fantasy sports
operators. Finally, Part IV offers recommendations to regulate the industry
that better reflect societal values than the current skill-chance distinction.
I.

OVERVIEW OF FANTASY SPORTS

A. Development of Fantasy Sports: From the Halls of Academia to
Millions of Living Rooms
Fantasy sports originated at Harvard University in the 1960s.8 Bill
Gamson, a social psychology research assistant, created a game for his
friends scored on baseball statistics where each player received a $100,000
imaginary budget to “draft” major league baseball athletes to their own
fantasy teams.9 His game, which had a ten-dollar entry fee, became
popular on campus, and Gamson, wanting to distance himself from
gambling, named it “the Baseball Seminar.”10
Daniel Okrent, the generally acknowledged father of fantasy sports,11
saw his statistics professors playing the Baseball Seminar when Okrent was
a student at the University of Michigan in 1965.12 Okrent, with the help of
some friends, was inspired to create his own version with a similar drafting
process but a more formalized point system that has carried over to the
present day: players’ successes are determined by the statistics their fantasy
teams generate in eight categories that Okrent determined to best correlate
with success in actual baseball seasons.13 Okrent’s “Rotisserie Baseball,”
named after the rotisserie restaurant where its rules were finalized, is the
primary format of season-long fantasy leagues today.14 Okrent and his
friends actually trademarked the term “Rotisserie Baseball” in hopes of
ym.com/?page=Demographics [https://perma.cc/GNW9-HBZG] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015).
8. Geoffrey Hancock, Upstaging U.S. Gaming Law: The Potential Fantasy Sports
Quagmire and the Reality of U.S. Gaming Law, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 317, 323-24 (20082009).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Michael J. Thompson, Give Me $25 on Red and Derek Jeter for $26: Do Fantasy
Sports Leagues Constitute Gambling?, 8 SPORTS LAW. J. 21, 22-24 (2001).
12. Hancock, supra note 8, at 324.
13. Thompson, supra note 11, at 22-24.
14. Hancock, supra note 8, at 323-24.
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someday making money from his invention.15 However, his unique name
was quickly abandoned for the generic, free-to-the-public and catchier term
“fantasy.”16 Now a successful Pulitzer-Prize nominated writer and editor,
Okrent does not harbor ill feelings, and he has found recognition as the first
person inducted into the Fantasy Sports Hall of Fame.17
Technological improvements and widespread access to the internet
have made fantasy sports a wildly popular phenomenon.18 Before
computers, compiling all of the necessary statistics to judge each fantasy
team was a daunting task attractive to academics such as Gamson and
Okrent.19 The internet brought with it websites that track these statistics
and “host” leagues, allowing people separated geographically to play
together and resulting in easier and more efficient access and the formation
of more leagues, as well as greater variety amongst them.20 Today, fantasy
sports are wildly popular; they are played by 14% of the U.S. population.21
Not surprisingly, as fantasy sports have attracted more participants,
they have also received wide support from sports leagues, which have
benefited from significant increases in both viewership of games and
merchandise sales.22 That is, before fantasy sports, most people used to
watch only their few favorite teams, while today, fantasy sports participants
watch their fantasy teams’ athletes in games most nights of the week23 In
addition, an ancillary market has quickly grown around fantasy sports, with
participants spending an average of $46 a year on materials to help with the
administration of their teams.24 Fantasy enthusiasts may also purchase
fantasy sport insurance25 and retain the services of strategic advisers who,
15. The
Quaz
Q&A:
Daniel
Okrent,
JEFF
PEARLMAN,
http://web.archive.org/web/20130106205742/http://www.jeffpearlman.com/the-quaz-qadaniel-okrent/ [https://perma.cc/3DHA-3YVH] (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
16. Id.
17. Id. Hall of Fame, FSTA, http://fsta.org/hall-of-fame/#1437065319438-f5969457caf2 [https://perma.cc/2GN6-38X9] (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
18. Thompson, supra note 11, at 23.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Industry Demographics, FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, http://fsta.siteym.com/?page=Demographics [https://perma.cc/FB6G-L8X4] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015).
22. See Jon Boswell, Fantasy Sports: A Game of Skill That is Implicitly Legal Under
State Law, and Now Explicitly Legal Under Federal Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1257, 1275 (2007-2008) (“Participation in fantasy sports leagues continues to increase the
revenues of professional sports leagues by strengthening and expanding fan bases,
introducing fans to teams and players from other cities, and increasing attendance.”).
23. Chris Isidore, How Fantasy Sports Changed the NFL, CNN MONEY (Sept. 11,
2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/11/news/companies/fantasy-football/
[https://perma.cc/4TBH-SVKB].
24. Industry Demographics, supra note 21.
25. Leighton Hunley, Real Insurance for Fantasy Football, RISK & INSURANCE (July
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much like financial analysts, crunch all the numbers and provide
suggestions on optimizing drafts and starting lineups.26 There is even a
television series revolving around friends in a fantasy football league which
aired for seven seasons.27 The entire industry has been valued at over $3
billion annually.28
B. Traditional Fantasy Sports
Today, fantasy leagues exist for a variety of sports at different levels,
including professional and college football, basketball, and hockey.29
While there are many variations from game to game, “traditional fantasy
sports” (TFS) are season-long fantasy leagues with a number of operational
commonalities.
Most leagues are hosted by online websites and have a
“commissioner,” the player who is responsible for gathering each
participant’s entry fee and enforcing the rules of the game.30 Participants
draft their teams at the beginning of the season, aiming to select athletes
that will perform well on a number of predetermined categories (e.g., home
runs and stolen bases). Participants generally construct their drafts in one
of three ways: (1) an automated draft, where each team is automatically
selected by a computer, (2) a round-robin/snake draft, where the last
participant to select an athlete in one round gets to pick first in the next, or
(3) an auction draft, where each participant receives a budget of credits
with which to bid and athletes go to the highest bidder.31 TFS drafts are
28,
2014),
http://www.riskandinsurance.com/real-insurance-fantasy-football/
[https://perma.cc/2G8L-9WTL] (“[D]esigned to recover costs for owners whose players
experience season-ruining injuries . . . [t]he coverage is intended to replace the league entry
fee, plus research expenses such as magazine or online subscriptions . . . . [C]overage
maximum is $1,000, including up to $250 for ancillary research expenses. Owners can
insure as many as five players per fantasy team and 10 players per season. . . . The premium
per player insured ranges from 9 percent—for a historically healthy player—to 13 percent
for an injury-prone player—of the coverage amount, plus taxes and fees.”).
26. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America
Regulates Its New National Pasttime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L 1, 24 (2012) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter Edelman, Short Treatise].
27. The
League,
IMBD,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1480684/
[https://perma.cc/TVD3-5FKQ] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015).
28. Nathaniel Ehrman, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of Pay-To-Play Daily
Fantasy Sports, 22 SPORTS LAW. J. 79, 82 (Spring 2015) (internal citation omitted).
29. Fantasy leagues even exist outside the sports arena, reaching as far as fantasy
Supreme Court leagues for law enthusiasts.
FantasySCOTUS, LEXPREDICT,
https://fantasyscotus.lexpredict.com [https://perma.cc/Z6EQ-QZ4F] (last visited Nov. 29,
2015).
30. Hancock, supra note 8, at 325.
31. Complaint at ¶ 22, Schneiderman v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 453056/15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
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competitive: each athlete may only be drafted once and all resulting teams
are unique.32 During the season, participants act as the managers of their
fantasy teams and have the ability to alter their weekly lineups in response
to events such as injuries and underperformance by benching, trading,
dropping and adding athletes.33
There is a plethora of methodologies for effectively drafting and
managing a fantasy league. At the basic level, each participant attempts to
gain points while simultaneously blocking her competitors from accruing
points. Ultimately, the player who is able to accumulate the most points
wins a monetary prize (composed of the entry fees) and—often more
importantly—bragging rights. The majority of TFS operators garner most
of their revenue from advertising and administrative fees.34
C. Daily Fantasy Sports: “Fantasy For the A.D.D. Generation”35
Daily fantasy sports (DFS) are the contests at the center of the current
legal controversy. They developed around 2009, in part to capture the
market of millennials who think season-long leagues are too lengthy a
commitment.36 The two main DFS platforms, and the only platforms on
which this comment focuses, are FanDuel and Draft Kings.
As the name suggests, their primary difference from TFS is the time
frame: the majority of DFS games last under twenty-four hours.37 This
short time frame relieves DFS players of the managerial role shouldered by
their TFS counterparts because once a player drafts her team, she cannot
alter the lineup.38 Another consequence of the short time frame is the
Cnty. Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter NYAG Complaint]; Ehrman, supra note 28, at 87;
Hancock, supra note 8, at 326.
32. Id.
33. Hancock, supra note 8, at 326.
34. NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 27.
35. Ehrman, supra note 28, at 82 (citing Jon Bales, Here’s What It Takes To Make a
Living
Playing
Fantasy
Sports,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Nov.
6
2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-pros-play-fantasy-sports-2013-11#ixzz2kU0ZUwd1
[https://perma.cc/37CN-3EYB].
36. “We [the creators of FanDuel] thought, ‘OK, great market, lack of innovation and
also really weird that this younger group is not coming in. Why don’t we take something
that people love and make it faster? . . . That was really the genesis of the idea, which is:
How do we make every day draft day? Everybody says the best day of the year is draft day.
That really was the product.” Ehrman, supra note 28, at 82 (citing Erik Matuszewski,
Fantasy Sports Luring Wall Street in Its Fastest-Growing Sector, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0106/fantasy-sports-luring-wall-street-in-its-fastest-growing-sector
[https://perma.cc/24R7BE6P].
37. Although some games last up to a week. Id.
38. NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 38(b).
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hindered accuracy of the DFS scoring system. There are several chance
circumstances under which the points do not accurately reflect a particular
athlete’s game performance and thus may not accurately reflect the true
winner of a contest.39 These circumstances include: games getting rained
out, postponed, suspended or shortened; the sport administrators’ failure to
correct official game statistics before the DFS platform declares a winner;
and trades that occur after a contest is initiated.40 Such timing-based
discrepancies can largely be avoided in season-long games and chance
events in general have less impact when distributed over the course of the
season.
The drafting process itself is also different. DFS utilize a “salary cap”
draft where each athlete is assigned a fictitious salary, which is correlated
to how many points the DFS platform predicts the player will earn in the
contest, and each player is given a virtual budget towards drafting her
team.41 This aspect makes the draft uncompetitive (players do not have to
compete with each other for draft picks since an unlimited number of
players can draft each athlete),42 but it also gives each player more latitude
in crafting their team unencumbered by chance events like draft pick order.
The final major difference between DFS and TFS is the competition
format. In TFS, players compete against the fantasy teams of other players
in their league.43 DFS games are structured in three ways: (1) head-to-head
games, where two players compete against each other and there is one
winner; (2) double-ups or 50/50, where the top scoring half of the
contestants win prizes; and (3) Guaranteed Prize Pools (GPPs), the largest
and most popular event where contestants can submit multiple entries and
only the top few contestants win prizes.44
The DFS industry is the entrepreneurial sibling of the bragging-rights
oriented TFS. DFS are also called “Pay-to-Play” Fantasy Sports45 because
the DFS sites directly profit from the users’ entry fees.46 Recently, TFS
operators, seeing the success of DFS, have adopted the “pay-to-play”
model and host season-long contests with monetary prizes.47 However,
39. Id. at ¶ 58.
40. Id. Such situations are not common problems in TFS, where players have a longer
time frame to correct any mistakes. Also, because TFS counts all the points over the course
of a season, one chance event will have less of an impact on a player’s ultimate score.
41. How
It
Works,
https://www.fanduel.com/how-it-works
FANDUEL,
[https://perma.cc/VJQ4-Y7Q9] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
42. NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 38.
43. Ehrman, supra note 28, at 86.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 52.
47. Marc Edelman, Yahoo!, CBS, ESPN and the NIFL Are Using Pay-To-Play Fantasy
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although TFS’ have been simplified by the internet, they are still quite
time-consuming and not very profitable. It would be difficult to actively
participate in more than a handful of TFS leagues at the same time. DFS
have radically altered this landscape by allowing players to compete
frequently (even multiple times in the same GPP) for up to $1 million in a
single contest.48 A small portion of DFS players utilize highly advanced
analytical programs and frequently wager large sums of money in order to
profit from this system.49
Investors have taken notice of the profitability of DFS. FanDuel and
DraftKings, combined, raised almost $800 million in total as of October
2015.50 The identity, or rather money and influence, of these investors is
also significant. DFS investors range from Google Capital to Time Warner
Investments and NBC Sports Ventures.51 Furthermore, the very real and
major sports leagues have also gotten in on the action. The National
Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, National Football
Association, and National Hockey League have all invested and/or
partnered with FanDuel and DraftKings.52 DFS operators have used a
significant portion of this money to launch an aggressive advertising
campaign with DraftKings and FanDuel reportedly airing an ad on national
television every ninety seconds for three weeks straight.53 That publicity,
however, has come with an unexpected price, for as one commentator has
noted, “[i]ronically, the marketing that has raised so much awareness about
these sites has also likely led to more scrutiny.”54 To that scrutiny and the
ensuing NYAG investigation we now turn.
II.

FAILED INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATION

Following the publication of the Ethan Haskell story, government
Football to Drive Website Traffic in Fall 2014, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2014)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/08/13/yahoo-cbs-espn-and-the-nfl-adoptpay-to-play-fantasy-football-contests-in-2014-to-drive-user-traffic/#4cc2818f6d37
[https://perma.cc/C4CB-N92U].
48. Grove, supra note 1.
49. Ed Miller & Dave Singer, For Daily Fantasy Sports Operators, the Curse of Too
Much
Skill,
SPORTS
BUSINESS
JOURNAL
(July
27,
2015),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/07/27/Opinion/From-the-Field-ofFantasy-Sports.aspx [https://perma.cc/AJD3-LT8D].
50. Davey Alba, Does Winning At Fantasy Sports Require Skill or Dumb Luck?,
WIRED (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/does-winning-at-fantasy-sportsrequire-skill-or-dumb-luck/ [https://perma.cc/Z787-GFGR].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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regulators and DFS lawyers went through the mechanical steps of a
corporate white collar crime investigation. As discussed in this section,
although the investigation did not lead to criminal charges, it has raised
questions about the integrity of the DFS industry and the adequacy of our
existing legal and regulatory framework.
On October 6, 2015, Kathleen McGee, Internet Bureau Chief at the
office of the New York Attorney General (“NYAG”), sent nearly identical
letters to the CEOs of DraftKings and FanDuel addressing “legal questions
relating to the fairness, transparency, and security of DraftKings [and
FanDuel] and the reliability of representations your company has made to
customers.” She requested a substantial amount of information, including
“the employee handbook and company policies on how data is handled and
whether the companies set limits on how much employees can win.”55
Both DraftKings and FanDuel retained former U.S. attorneys to head their
investigations.56
On October 19, 2015, DraftKings released the results of their external
independent report: Haskell obtained the non-public aggregate user data
forty minutes after his winning lineup on FanDuel was locked in.57 This
evidence of “innocence” fell by the wayside, however, for in just a matter
of weeks what had started as an investigation into the integrity of FanDuel
and DraftKings had turned into a full-out attack on the legality of the DFS
business model, with the NYAG asserting that DFS are illegal regardless of
whether or not there was any insider trading.58 On November 10, Eric
Schneiderman of NYAG sent both websites cease-and-desist letters,
accusing them of operating illegal gambling operations and telling them to
stop taking bets from New York residents.59 By November 17, the NYAG
filed formal criminal charges against both FanDuel and DraftKings in New
55. Kat Greene, NY AG Wants Fantasy Sports Data Amid Insider Accusations,
LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/711832/ny-ag-wants-fantasysports-data-amid-insider-accusations [https://perma.cc/75UX-HM58].
56. Zachary Zagger, Scandalized Fantasy Cos. Hire Debevoise, Kirkland, Greenberg,
LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/713126/scandalized-fantasy-coshire-debevoise-kirkland-greenberg [https://perma.cc/XT5Z-SFBP].
57. DraftKings Summary of Findings, DRAFTKINGS (Oct. 19, 2015), http://pbcdn.draftkings.com.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/DraftKingsIndependant-Summary-of-Findings-GT-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZZ3-Q5AT].
58. See e.g., Zachary Zagger, Daily Fantasy Woes Grow As Leagues Become Targets,
LAW360 (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/730744/daily-fantasy-woesgrow-as-leagues-become-targets [https://perma.cc/6QTN-9RJV] (reporting that the NYAG
is trying to shut down Draft Kings Inc. and Fan Duel Inc. under the theory that they are
illegal under state gambling laws).
59. Y. Peter Kang, NY AG Deems DraftKings, FanDuel Illegal Gambling, Law360
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/725909/ny-ag-deems-draftkings-fanduelillegal-gambling [https://perma.cc/N2TK-BL8U].
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York Supreme Court.60
It is unclear why the NYAG abandoned the inquiry into the integrity
of fantasy sports; it may be because the legal teams of DraftKings and
FanDuel sent over conclusive evidence of unquestionably fair conduct.
Maybe the NYAG strategically chose to focus on the overall regulatory
scheme instead of employee misconduct, although that would not explain
why it dropped insider trading charges and retained fraudulent advertising
charges.
Perhaps, the NYAG perceived insurmountable hurdles in satisfying
the elements of traditional insider trading. The Security Exchange
Commission’s Rule 10b-5 (the generally applicable anti-fraud rule) is
limited to “the purchase or sale of any security,” which would not appear to
encompass paying to participate in a DFS Contest.61 Even if the NYAG
could get past that initial hurdle, Rule 10b-5 has further specific
requirements that DFS employees may not satisfy, including a showing of
fiduciary duty, materiality and loss causation.62
While the exact reasoning of the NYAG is unclear, it is clear that any
expectation by FanDuel and DraftKings that their cooperation with the
NYAG’s investigation would result in their benefit was for naught.
Instead, they are now defending the very legality of their entire business
model.
III.

THE GAMBLING FRAMEWORK

DFS originated in only 2009,63 but are now, in 2016, “an active topic
for lawmakers, regulators, or law enforcement officials in almost two
dozen states.”64 Most states, including New York, utilize some version of
the common law gambling definition, which prohibits “activities in which a
person pays consideration—usually cash—for the opportunity to win a
prize in a game of chance.”65 This section focuses on the litigation
60. Id.
61. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW
431 (Lexis Nexis 4th ed. 2013).
62. Id.
63. Ehrman, supra note 28, at 82.
64. DFS State Watch: Monitoring Daily Fantasy Sports Action in State Government,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORTER
(last
updated
Jan.
20,
2016),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-state-watch/ [https://perma.cc/Y37Z-7LYL].
65. Anthony N. Cabot et al., Alex Rodriguez, A Monkey, and the Game of Scrabble:
The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Game of Mixed Skill and Chance, 57
DRAKE L. REV. 383, 384 (2008-2009) (citing Darrell W. Bolen, Gambling: Historical
Highlights and Trends and Their Implications for Contemporary Society, in GAMBLING AND
SOCIETY 7 (William R. Eddington ed., 1976)).
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currently taking place in New York; however similar arguments around this
common law definition can be expected in other jurisdictions. The federal
gambling framework, as shown in the second part of this section, relies
heavily on state law and unfortunately does not offer any more protection
or predictability in the fantasy sports industry.
A. The New York Fight
On December 11, 2015, the NYAG got an early victory in its litigation
against FanDuel and DraftKings: NY Supreme Court Judge Manuel J.
Mendez granted the NYAG a preliminary injunction, ordering both
companies to immediately shut down in New York, “finding their daily
fantasy sports contests likely constituted gambling under state law.”66 This
victory was short-lived, however, since the NY Appeals Court stayed the
preliminary injunction, allowing both companies to operate as the litigation
continues.67
DraftKings’ and FanDuel’s legal fight with the NYAG is likely to
continue for a lengthy period of time. There is a lot at stake for the welllawyered DFS operators: millions of dollars in lost potential revenue from
customers in its largest market, New York, as well as the over $200 million
dollars being sought by the NYAG in punitive damages and restitution.68
While the ultimate verdict on the legality of DFS is unclear, an analysis of
New York’s gambling statutes reveals that TFS and DFS are not materially
different activities, and they should be treated similarly. If DFS are found
to be gambling under New York law, the same fate should befall TFS.
1. It is unclear whether DFS constitute illegal gambling Under New
York Law.
The New York Attorney General has charged FanDuel and Draft
Kings with nine violations of New York state law in the Supreme Court of
the State of New York’s New York County.69 The primary allegations at
issue, on which the case hinges, are those of illegal gambling and fraud.
Unfortunately for the NYAG, these two arguments cut against each other;
66. Zachary Zagger, New York Appeals Court Halts Injunction In Daily Fantasy
Action, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/745155/ny-appeals-courthalts-injunction-in-daily-fantasy-action [https://perma.cc/Q9WV-XQBX].
67. Id.
68. Joe Drape, New York Wants Fantasy Customers Repaid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/02/sports/revised-complaint-seeks-return-of-money-beton-fantasy-sports.html [https://perma.cc/AR5A-E9LK].
69. NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, ¶¶ 115-58.
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the first charge alleges DFS are games of chance, while the second charge
accuses DFS operators of overstating just how much chance is involved in
DFS.70
The New York State penal code provides definitions of “gambling”
and its relevant parts, “something of value” and “contest of chance”:
“Gambling.” A person engages in gambling when he [1] stakes
or risks something of value [2] upon the outcome of a contest of
chance or a future contingent event not under his control or
influence, [3] upon an agreement or understanding that he will
receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome.71
“Something of value” means any money or property, any token,
object or article exchangeable for money or property, or any form
of credit or promise directly or indirectly contemplating transfer
of money or property or of any interest therein, or involving
extension of a service, entertainment or a privilege of playing at a
game or scheme without charge.72
“Contest of chance” means any contest, game, gaming scheme or
gaming devise in which the outcome depends in a material
degree upon an element of chance, notwithstanding that skill of
the contestants may also be a factor therein.73

TFS and DFS leagues where any money is involved74 both satisfy the
first and third elements of this gambling statute: participants risk some
amount of money upon the understanding that they will receive a larger
sum of money in the event that they accumulate the largest amount of
points in their fantasy contest. FanDuel and DraftKings have argued that
they do not fall within this language because players are merely paying
“entry fees” to compete in contests for prizes.75 However, New York
common law has consistently interpreted “something of value” broadly. As
the NYAG points out in its memorandum for a preliminary injunction, in
People v. Miller, the court found that charging moviegoers the price of a
movie ticket for the chance to win a randomly drawn cash prize fell under
70. Id.
71. NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (Consol. 2016).
72. NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(6) (Consol. 2016).
73. NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(1) (Consol. 2016).
74. This analysis focuses on TFS leagues where money is exchanged for the sake of a
more appropriate comparison to DFS. However, free leagues may actually also fall under
this broad statutory language, should a court decide that reputational advantage is
“something of value.” In People v. Miller, a penny was deemed something of value, albeit
for the first factor, demonstrating how broadly the statute has been interpreted. 271 N.Y.
44, 47, 2 N.E.2d 38, 39 (1936) (citing People v. Runge, 3 N.Y. Crime Rep. 885 (1885)).
75. Memorandum of FanDuel Inc. In Opposition To Plaintiff’s Motion For a
Preliminary Injunction at 21, Schneiderman v. FanDuel, No. 453056/15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Cnty. Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter FanDuel Memo].

2016]

REAL LIABILITIES FOR FANTASY SPORTS

1219

the gambling statute.76 Movie tickets are undoubtedly entry fees and
moviegoers “risked” very little, in comparison to DFS participants, as they
still got to see a film with those tickets regardless of whether or not they
won the prize. Consequently, the defendants’ argument should fail here.
The entire gambling charge will therefore rest on the New York
judiciary’s interpretation of the second factor: whether DFS games are
contests of chance. Here, the state and the defendants disagree on the
appropriate legal test. The NYAG is promoting a “material element test,”
and concludes that DFS fails because chance is a significant factor in
determining the outcome.77 The defendants argue that a “dominating
element test” should be employed and conclude that DFS passes because
skill, rather than chance, is the most important factor in determining the
outcome.78 Given the language of the statute, the NYAG’s position appears
more convincing. The statute defines “contest of chance” as one where the
“outcome depends in a material degree upon an element of chance” and
specifically points out that this provision applies even if skill of participants
is also a factor.79
Even if the court decides to utilize the government’s proposed
“material element test,” it is still unclear whether it will find that DFS
constitutes gambling. This is a frustrating characteristic of gambling
regulations. “[T]here’s no universal test for quantifying the distribution of
skill and chance in outcomes of a given name. It’s fundamentally a matter
of opinion . . . . There’s not some simple mathematical threshold between
‘chance’ and ‘skill’ that can help make a determination.”80 The difficulty
in quantifying the skill involved has not stopped FanDuel and DraftKings
from retaining experts to conduct studies purporting to demonstrate that
skill in fact controls the outcome of DFS contests.81
Given the
aforementioned lack of a mathematical threshold on this matter, it is
unlikely that these expert findings will carry much weight in the ultimate
decision.
Both sides have put forward strong arguments as to the proper test.
On the one hand, the short time frame of DFS certainly makes chance very
important in some games, like where athletes score significantly higher or
lower than their average statistics or when weather impacts scoring. “Any
76. Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the NYAG’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction 23-27, Schneiderman v. FanDuel, No. 453056/15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Nov. 23,
2015) [hereinafter NYAG Memo]. See People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44, 48 (1936).
77. Id. at 6 (citing People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44, 48 (1936)).
78. FanDuel Memo, supra note 75, at 72.
79. NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(1) (Consol. 2016) (emphasis added).
80. Alba, supra note 50.
81. FanDuel Memo, supra note 75, at 9 (“The Empirical Evidence”).
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one of those factors, standing alone, can fundamentally alter the outcome of
a DFS wager and introduce indelible and unavoidable elements of chance
into any DFS contest. That is particularly apparent because the margin of
victory in a DFS contest is often measured in fractions of points.”82 On the
other hand, the fact that chance will impact the outcome of some games
does not make all DFS games contests of chance. The top few percent of
players in DFS contests win an overwhelmingly large portion of the prize
money, which suggests that chance is certainly not the determinative
factor—and perhaps not even a significant factor—when you analyze the
activity as a whole.83
Ironically, this fact, which supports the legality of DFS under most
gambling statutes, threatens to make the industry unprofitable. DFS has
advertised itself to look like illegal gambling because that is what will draw
in consumers.84 As Joshua Brustein, a reporter for Bloomberg Business,
explains:
To get to the size their investors are expecting requires a
continuous stream of new [and unskilled] players lured by everincreasing prize pools with the help of muscular advertising
campaigns. These ads never spell out a simple truth about daily
fantasy competitions: While any player might get lucky on the
back of a handful of entries, over time nearly all of the prize
money flows to a tiny elite equipped with elaborate statistical
modeling and automated tools that can manage hundreds of
entries at once and identify the weakest opponents.85

Various commentators have pointed out this fact in articles with titles
like “You Aren’t Good Enough to Win Money Playing Daily Fantasy
Sports” and “For Daily Operators, the Curse of Too Much SkilL.” The
NYAG’s complaint concedes that few skilled players win more often and
actually charges DFS platforms with fraudulent conduct for
“misrepresenting the likelihood of a casual player will win a jackpot

82. NYAG Memo, supra note 76, at 9 (citing Nov. 17, 2015 Affidavit of Vanessa Ip
Pertaining to DraftKings, Inc., No. 453054/15, D.I. 43 (“Ip DK Aff.”) ¶ 48).
83. “A recent study in Sports Business Daily found that over the first half of this year’s
Major League Baseball season, 91 percent of daily fantasy sports player profits were won by
just 1.3 percent of the players. In fact, on average, the top 11 players paid $2 million in entry
fees and made profits of $135,000 each while accounting for 17 percent of all entry fees.”
Drape & Williams, supra note 3 (citing Miller & Singer, supra note 49).
84. Joshua Brustein, You Aren’t Good Enough to Win Money Playing Daily Fantasy
Football,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS
(Sep.
10,
2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/you-aren-t-good-enough-to-winmoney-playing-daily-fantasy-football [https://perma.cc/CV23-2RBD].
85. Id. at 2.
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[sic].”86 This charge, confusingly followed by another fraud charge for
“misrepresenting the degree of skill implicated in the games,”87 strongly
cuts against the NYAG’s factual analysis of “contest of chance.” The fact
that a small number of players can consistently win prizes is not conclusive
evidence that outcomes are determined by skill, but it is strong evidence
that outcomes also are not determined by chance.88
2. TFS Are Materially Similar to DFS
In its initial complaint, the NYAG argued that DFS are games of
chance and, as such, are materially different from TFS games of skill.89 A
comparison of the two activities reveals otherwise,-at least with regards to
the relevant criteria on which the NYAG has relied to bring his charge. In
a later memorandum, the NYAG has ceased using the legality of TFS as a
baseline argument, instead focusing on the differing roles of operators in
each activity. However, this distinction fails to account for the burgeoning
market around TFS.
The NYAG has stated that TFS are more reliant on skill for three main
reasons: (1) longer time frame, (2) competitive drafts, and (3) the
managerial role of participants.90 However, the season-long nature of TFS
makes individual chance events less important, as their impact will be
distributed amongst the statistics of many weeks. DFS contests will be
more impacted by singular chance events and scoring discrepancies, since
there are fewer games in each contest. Nevertheless, the short time frame
actually helps DFS players be more responsive to chance events since they
have until moments before games start to choose their lineups. “Part of the
skill element is trying to gauge uncertainty and use it to your advantage.”91
A DFS player can limit her exposure to speculated injuries and forecasted
bad weather, while a TFS player will be constrained by draft-day picks.

86. NYAG Complaint, supra note 31, at ¶ 144(b).
87. Id. at ¶ 144(c).
88. FanDuel and DraftKings argue that the consistent winners are thus evidently
“skilled” at the DFS contests. It may be that these top winners are misusing insider
information, as these statistics were collected before both platforms prohibited their
employees from participating in contests, and it is unclear what percentage of winners were
employed by the two websites. These suggestions are unlikely to be explored in the New
York litigation, as a result of the failed insider trading investigation.
89. Cease & Desist Letter, STATE OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/725909/ny-ag-deems-draftkings-fanduelillegal-gambling (click on “letter” under documents in right panel) [https://perma.cc/XAB9BCNA] [hereinafter Cease & Desist Letter].
90. See, NYAG Memo, supra note 76.
91. Ehrman, supra note 28, at 107.
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The competitive draft, which the NYAG argues is more indicative of
skill, actually leaves TFS players more exposed to chance throughout the
season. Since each athlete can only get drafted once in a competitive draft,
the pool of un-drafted “free-agents” is made up of low-scoring athletes. If
a TFS player’s top round draft picks get injured early in the season, she will
be unable to counteract those chance events. This demonstrates the narrow
scope of the “managerial” role touted by the NYAG as evidence of skill in
TFS. Theoretically, TFS participants have the opportunity to alter their
lineups every week but, practically, they will be forced to make limited
changes unless they want to bet on low-scoring free-agents. Finally, the
short time frame of DFS also makes it harder for disinterested players to
compete. In TFS, someone can utilize an auto-draft or rely on a
snake/round-robin draft to equalize everyone’s teams and then make
minimal changes to his or her lineup each week. In DFS, players have to
set a brand new lineup each time they play, and the salary cap draft greatly
expands the amount of various strategic choices they can make.
In a later memorandum, the NYAG has backed away from its previous
comparisons of TFS and DFS, stating that the legally relevant distinction
rests simply on the different ways that these activities handle money.92
DFS is an activity in which the operators take a cut of the participants’
entry fees, much like gambling “bookies,” while TFS operators generally
offer free or cheap, administrative fee-based, services.93 In a parenthetical
buried in that memorandum, the NYAG reveals why this factual difference
is significant: New York law does not prohibit social gambling.94 The
gambling statute defines gambling broadly, but all related criminal charges
stem from engaging in the business of gambling. So, while TFS may fall
under New York’s definition of gambling, no entrepreneurs have made as
much money from it as the defendants in DFS and caught the NYAG’s
attention as potential defendants.
While it is true that no operator has monetized TFS to the extent that
FanDuel and DraftKings have monetized DFS, many of the operators have
in fact created pay-to-play contests with prizes in a format identical to that
of FanDuel and DraftKings.95 Furthermore, the entire market of products
92. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for an Interim Stay, 3637, No. 453054/15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty., Dec. 22, 2015).
93. Id.
94. “[S]ee Penal Law § 225.00(3) (exempting ‘gambl[ing] at a social game of
chance’).” Id. at 36.
95. Marc Edelman, Yahoo!, CBS, ESPN and the NIFL Are Using Pay-To-Play Fantasy
Football to Drive Website Traffic in Fall 2014, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2014)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/08/13/yahoo-cbs-espn-and-the-nfl-adoptpay-to-play-fantasy-football-contests-in-2014-to-drive-user-traffic/#4cc2818f6d37
[https://perma.cc/VMG7-Y5B9].
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supporting TFS (for example, fantasy football insurance) is exposed to
charges like “promoting gambling” for “profiting from unlawful gambling
activity.”96 This distinction is not a silver bullet and only underlines how
reliant actors in fantasy sports are dependent on prosecutorial discretion.
B. Inadequacy of Federal Regulation
DraftKings and FanDuel have heavily relied on a federal statute to
justify their legality. However, federal gambling regulations rely on state
law definitions.97 Thus, federal law cannot save DFS from liability in New
York or other states. Some commentators have said Federal Law will at
least protect fantasy sports from federal chargers where state law allows
them to operate.98 The following analysis challenges this contention and
identifies two federal statutes in particular that are potential sources of
concern: the Illegal Gambling Business Act and the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act.99
1. The Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA) of 1970
Congress enacted the IGBA in 1970 in an effort to curb organized
crime and target gambling operations of major proportions.100 Most
96. NY PENAL LAW § 225.05 (Consol. 2016).
97. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Overview, FEDERAL
DEPOSIT
INSURANCE
CORPORATION
(July
30,
2010),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10035a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A7JR479C].
98. Edelman, Short Treatise, supra note 26, at 95 (“The UIGEA exception for fantasy
sports does not make fantasy sports legal because they may still violates other state or
federal laws; it merely guarantees that the government will not prosecute fantasy sports
under the act.”).
99. This is not an exhaustive discussion of all of the relevant federal statutes but
instead a focus on the two statutes most often referenced in media coverage of DFS. For a
more thorough analysis of potential legal issues for fantasy sports see Marc Edelman’s A
Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America Regulates Its New National
Pasttime. 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1 (2012).
100. “The legislative history is remarkably clear that the passage of this statute was
driven by the desire to crack down on organized crime.” United States v. DiCristina, 726
F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir 2013). “While gambling may seem to most Americans to be the least
reprehensible of all the activities of organized crime, it is gambling which provides the bulk
of the revenues that eventually go into usurious loans, bribes of police and local officials,
‘campaign contributions’ to politicians, the wholesale narcotics traffic, the infiltration of
legitimate businesses, and to pay for the large stables of lawyers and accountants and
assorted professional men who are in the hire of organized crime.” United States v.
DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 10,043 (Apr.
23, 1969) (President Nixon’s Message to Congress)).
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“kitchen table” poker games are not subject to this legislation.101 The
IGBA does not make gambling a federal crime, nor does it even define
gambling. Instead, it criminalizes participating (owning, financing,
managing or directing) in a gambling business.102 A gambling business is
defined as one which: (1) violates state or local law; (2) involves five or
more persons; and (3) is in continuous operation for a period in excess of
thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.103 This
statute provides a nonexclusive list of gambling activities, including
bookmaking and conducting lotteries,104 and also provides a carve-out for
“game[s] of chance” run by tax-exempt organizations.105
In 2012, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York interpreted the carve-out language to mean that the IGBA only
prohibited games of chance.106 However, this decision was overturned by
the Second Circuit, which held that the IGBA does not create its own
definition of gambling, but rather relies explicitly on state law: “the
question of whether skill or chance predominates in poker is inapposite to
this appeal. The language of the statute is clear that it contains only three
requirements, all set forth in subsection (b)(1).”107
Accordingly, the application of the IGBA to fantasy sports will hinge
on state law. Operators of both TFS and DFS platforms would be in
violation of this statute in states that that decide their operations are illegal
gambling under section (b)(1)(i). Online hosts of both activities are major
corporations with over five employees, and therefore satisfy (b)(1)(ii). TFS
platforms are all “operated in excess of thirty days,” since they last the
entirety of a sport season and DFS platforms take in significantly more than
“$2,000 in any single day,” fulfilling the requirements of(b)(1)(iii).
2. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) of
2006
The UIGEA was passed as “midnight drop” legislation, attached to a
bi-partisan and unrelated national security bill that senators could not vote
101. Id.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1994).
103. Id. §1955(b)(1).
104. Id. §1955(b)(4).
105. Id. §1955(e).
106. See DiCristina, 886 F. Supp 2d at 235 (“Neither the text of the IGBA nor its
legislative history demonstrate that Congress designed the statute to cover all state gambling
offenses. Nor does the definition of “gambling” include games, such as poker, which are
predominated by skill. The rule of lenity compels a narrow reading of the IGBA, and
dismissal of defendant’s conviction.”).
107. DiCristina, 726 F.3d at 100.

2016]

REAL LIABILITIES FOR FANTASY SPORTS

1225

against at the last minute.108 Legislative history indicates that the bill’s
proponents were worried about the proliferation of crime online and the
addictiveness and accessibility of online gambling, particularly to collegeaged and underage demographics.109 Other supporters of the bill included
legal gambling establishments that did not want to face competition,
religious and social conservatives worried about moral decay, and
professional sports leagues opposed to sports betting.110 Some more
skeptical commentators posit that the UIGEA was primarily motivated by
domestic economy concerns since off-shore online gambling operators
were taking millions of dollars out of the U.S. economy.111
Like the IGBA, the UIGEA does not criminalize or define gambling.
Both acts supplement existing state regulations and rely on those
definitions.112 Both the IGBA and the UIGEA attack commercial
gambling, but while the IGBA focuses on large scale gambling operators,
the UIGEA attacks the mechanism by which online gambling is funded.113
The act has broad coverage: “[n]o person engaged in the business of betting
or wagering may knowingly accept” specified financial instruments “in
connection with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet
gambling.”114 Unlawful internet gambling is defined as placing, receiving,
or otherwise knowingly transmitting a bet or wager via the Internet in

108. “Legislators were smart to attach a relatively controversial bill to one destined to
ensure national security.” Dana Gale, The Economic Incentive Behind the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 533, 539 n.44 (2007) (internal
citations omitted).
109. Thompson, supra note 11, at 25; S. REP. NO. 106-121, at 13-16 (1999) (internal
citations and footnotes omitted).
110. Gale, supra note 108, at 545.
111. Id. at 546 (“If the stated intent reflected the true motivations of legislators, the Act
would not have carved out exceptions for specific American gambling entities. These
carve-outs, when combined with the absence of any articulated means for treating gambling
problems, indicate that the Act ‘looks to be more focused on keeping gaming revenue within
U.S. borders.’”) (internal citations omitted).
112. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2182 (1978)
(“Congress did not assimilate state gambling laws per se into the [IGBA] . . . nor did it
define discrete acts of gambling as independent federal offenses.”) (internal citations and
footnotes omitted); see also, Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y Gen. of
U.S., 580 F.3d 113, 116 (3d. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he [UIGEA] . . . does not itself outlaw any
gambling activity, but rather incorporates other Federal or State law related to gambling.”)
(internal citations and footnotes omitted).
113. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Overview, FEDERAL
DEPOSIT
INSURANCE
CORPORATION
(July
30,
2010),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10035a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UC58ZT4X].
114. 31 U.S.C. § 5363.
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violation of some pre-existing federal, state, or tribal law.115 Both
individuals and financial institutions may be found liable under this act.116
The UIGEA contains a carve-out for fantasy sports that was lobbied
for by the Major League Baseball Players Association and incorporated in
an earlier version of the bill after “extensive discussions” with groups
including fantasy sports league interests, institutions of higher education,
Internet service providers, the National Football League, the National
Collegiate Athletic Association, and the National Association of Attorneys
General.117 The news media has collectively deemed this to be conclusive
evidence of the legality of fantasy sports.118 DFS operators have also used
this in support of their own legality.119 Legislative history reflects that the
fantasy sports carve-out here is a narrow one. The Senate report on this
amendment, for example, explicitly states that this carve-out is not intended
to legalize fantasy sports nationally, given their highly fact-dependent
status under state law. The report specifically recognizes that some state
may consider fantasy sports to be gambling.120
The carve-out operates by exempting fantasy sport games that meet
the listed conditions from the definition of a bet or wager.121 One of these
conditions is that “[a]ll prizes and awards offered to winning participants
are established and made known to the participants in advance of the game
or contest and their value is not determined by the number of participants
or the amount of any fees paid by those participants.”122 TFS prize pools
are almost always determined by the amount of fees paid by the
participants. Even if the host website collects fees, the ultimate prize is the
remaining money that all participants contributed. This provision is
115. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10).
116. See e.g., United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 729 (1st Cir. 2014) (convicting the
defendant on ten counts of violating the UIGEA); see also 31 C.F.R. § 132.2 (clarifying
liability for financial institutions under the UIGEA).
117. S. REP. NO. 106-121, at 9 (1999).
118. See e.g., Brustein, supra note 84 (“Making money from fantasy sports is perfectly
legal. A federal law restricting sports gambling has an exemption for games of skill, which
fantasy games fit into.”); Drape & Williams, supra note 3.
119. Playing on DraftKings Is 100% Legal in the USA, DRAFTKINGS,
https://www.draftkings.com/help/why-is-it-legal [https://perma.cc/3LJX-TXB3] (last visited
Dec. 9, 2015); Is FanDuel Legal, FANDUEL, https://fanduel.zendesk.com/hc/enus/articles/210202858-Is-FanDuel-legal- [https://perma.cc/9S29-XK9F] (“Fantasy Sports is
considered a game of skill and received a specific exemption from the 2006 Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA).”) (last visited Dec. 9, 2015).
120. S. REP. NO. 106-121, at 27 (1999). Note that this Senate report pertains to an
earlier version of the UIGEA - the Internet Gambling Prohibition Senate Bill of 1999 which did not ultimately pass. Nevertheless, this language still holds true as the UIGEA
ultimately hinges on state law definitions of gambling.
121. 31 U.S.C. § 5362((1)(A)).
122. 31 U.S.C. § 5362((1)(A)(I)).
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troublesome for all TFS participants and their financial institutions. DFS
large tournaments, in which prizes are guaranteed, are in compliance with
this provision, but the remainder of their games run afoul of it, a point
made obvious by the fact that only one type of game is categorized as
“Guaranteed Prize Pool”.123 If that labeling were not enough, FanDuel’s
support website explains exactly how they miss the carve-out: “if the
league is not completely filled by the start of the game then all entries on
that league are voided and the entry fees returned to the users accounts.
The one exception to this is the large field tournaments, where the contest
and prize pool are typically guaranteed, regardless of the number of
entrants.”124 Oddly enough, DFS platforms comply with the provision
where it is most expensive to do so: “[i]f a site says it is going to offer a $1
million prize for a tournament with a $20 entry fee, it has to pay out
whether it attracts 60,000 players or 30,000. Falling short can be very
expensive.”125
Another stringent and applicable condition is that “ALL winning
outcomes” must “reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the
participants.”126 It is unclear how courts will apply this to fantasy sports.
TFS contains season-long managerial roles for participants, which reflect
relative knowledge and skill. However, TFS also allows for auto-drafting,
which may not amount to the sufficient amount of skill. It is likely that this
inquiry will be highly fact-driven. For instance, a TFS league winner who
used an auto-draft, did not alter his or her lineup all season and ended up
winning at the end of a football season full of surprises would be violating
the text of this statute. Yet, that same league may fit within the exception if
a more active, knowledgeable participant won. This statutory language is
not clear enough to give the many financial participants heavily invested in
fantasy sports confidence or guidance.
IV.

REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES

TFS and DFS are legally vulnerable because of the unpredictable
character of gambling regulation. The skill-chance distinction can lead to
fifty different regulatory frameworks with further variations based on each
particular contest. This section examines the origins of the skill-chance
distinction, demonstrates how poorly it matches regulators’ goals and
123. Ehrman, supra note 28, at 86.
124. FanDuel
Support,
FANDUEL,
https://fanduel.zendesk.com/hc/enus/articles/210203578-What-happens-if-my-entry-doesn-t-get-matched-or-not-all-the-spotsare-filled-in-a-multi-person-game- [https://perma.cc/G3P3-S3FT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015)
125. Brustein, supra note 84.
126. 31 U.S.C. § 5362((1)(A)(II)) (emphasis added).
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suggests an alternative framework based on dollar amount spent per person.
A. History of Skill-Chance Distinction
Risk-taking has been called a “distinctively American value,” and
gambling has not always been prohibited on our shores.127 In fact, lotteries,
card games, horse race bets, and the like were all popular ways to raise
money for public funds before the institution of modern tax regimes.128 For
example, revenue from lotteries, which often acted like modern day bondofferings, was used to support colonial troops during the Revolutionary
War and to improve the Erie Canal.129
Gambling, however, goes back much further than the American
colonies. Anthropological studies have discovered the ubiquitous presence
of various forms of gambling in all societies during all eras of history.130
The drawing of lots, one of the oldest forms of gambling, is found
throughout the Bible: “Moses divided land among Israel’s twelve tribes by
choosing lots, and the Bible describes Roman soldiers casting lots for the
robes of Christ following his crucifixion.”131 Back then, people viewed the
outcome of such a lottery not as a mere chance occurrence but rather as the
revelation of the will of some supernatural force or deity.132
By the nineteenth century, the outcomes of lotteries had lost the image
of divinity for American Puritans, who began to publicly and profoundly
disapprove of gambling.133 This disapproval centered around the perceived
immorality of allowing individuals to gain something in exchange for
nothing - “of earning fortune by mere chance” - in direct opposition to the
Puritan worth ethic.134 Religious reformers continued speaking out against
the evils of gambling and their sentiments regarding the basic distinction of
skill and chance steadily spread amongst Christian adherents. In 1959,
127. Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals & Private Markets: Online Securities
Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 372 (2006)
(citation omitted).
128. Id. at 394.
129. Id.
130. Cabot, supra note 65 (citing Darrell W. Bolen, Gambling: Historical Highlights
and Trends and Their Implications for Contemporary Society, in GAMBLING AND SOCIETY 7
(William R. Eddington ed., 1976)).
131. Id. at 385 (internal citations omitted).
132. Id. (citing Reuven Brenner & Gabrielle A. Brenner, Gambling Speculation: A
Theory, A History, And a Future of Some Human Decisions 1 (1990)).
133. White Paper on Daily Fantasy Sports, MASSACHUSETTS GAMING COMMISSION 1112 (Jan. 11, 2016), available at http://massgaming.com/wp-content/uploads/MGC-WhitePaper-on-Daily-Fantasy-Sports-1-11-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4D-E5WY]. [hereinafter
MA White Paper].
134. Id. at 11.
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gambling was described at the American Baptist Convention as “the
redistribution of a people’s wealth according to chance rather than
according to the receiver’s contribution to society.”135
Interestingly, just as the topic of regulating fantasy sports took on
fervor after reports of “insider trading,” gambling legislation seems to have
made significant headway after middlemen made lotteries a profitable
business with increasing rates of fraud.136 The skill-chance distinction,
originating from Puritan morals, ultimately made its way into American
legislation where it has remained through the modern day. “A consequence
of legislating this moral judgment has been the legal contortions of many
forms of betting to demonstrate their reliance on skill, as opposed to
chance.”137 FanDuel and DraftKings are not the first defendants to utilize
this “skill” argument. A very similar and unpredictable legal battle
previously took place around various forms of poker, with some courts
deeming it illegal gambling but others legal games of skill.138
B. Mismatch Between Regulatory Language and Goals
As the prior analysis has shown, the skill-chance distinction is a poor
regulatory tool offering little legal predictability.
Moreover, two
hypothetical individuals help illustrate why the skill-chance distinction is
not even the truly relevant issue in this debate:
JANICE is an accountant who joined her office TFS league.139 She
does not watch, or even like, sports; she joined the league for the
chance to win money and socialize with her coworkers. She
picked her team using an auto-drafter, or in an arbitrary manner,
perhaps based on the names she liked the most in a snake draft.
135. Id. Other religious leaders, for instance Elder Dallin H. Oaks of the Church of
Latter-Day Saints, used rather more inflammatory words to highlight this distinction:
“Whatever encourages men to take from one another without giving value in return serves
the cause of Satan.”
136. Cabot, supra note 65, at 387 (“In response to the rise in fraud and subsequent loss
of public support, state after state began to ‘abolish lotteries and prohibited private parties
from selling tickets.’”) (internal citations omitted).
137. MA White Paper, supra note 133, at 12.
138. See, e.g., Cabot, supra note 65, at 401-02, n.106 (pointing out that in Massachusetts
video poker was deemed an illegal game of chance by the federal First Circuit Court of
Appeals, but a legal game of skill by the state Court of Appeals)(citing United States v.
Marder, 48 F.3d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1995); Commonwealth v. Club Caravan, Inc., 571
N.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Mass. Appl. Ct. 1991)).
139. Janice is borrowed from the character of “Janice from Accounting” from a satirical
news show featuring a discussion of DFS. Last Week Tonight With John Oliver (Nov. 15,
2015),
available
at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mq785nJ0FXQ
[https://perma.cc/D68B-K3JS].
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Janice ends up as the winner of her league after a particularly
surprising season; she gets to keep the $200 office pool.
SAM is a full-time professional DFS player.140 He has degrees in
math and economics, work experience in data science, and a
successful history in online poker. He spends between eight and
fifteen hours a day working on DFS. He has created custom-built
predictive models and has a technique for identifying unpopular
but effective athletes. He plays about a 1,000 contests a week
during NFL season and has made $2 million so far this year.

Sam relies on skill to win and profit from DFS. Janice has, to the
great annoyance of her football enthusiast colleagues, won on chance.
Janice’s league is directly violating the UIGEA.141 While it is unclear how
Sam will be treated under New York or federal law, it is clear that he is less
culpable than Janice under a regime that allows games of skill but not
chance. Yet, Sam, the objectively skilled player, is the person who is
troublesome to regulators and commentators; Sam is being accused of
exploiting a loophole intended for Janice. This hypothetical scenario
suggests that the real issue troubling regulators is not the lack of skill
involved in DFS, but rather the presence of high-profiting middlemen, or
the business of fantasy sports.
C. Removing the Skill-Chance Distinction
Our nation’s archaic gambling framework has resulted in “a public
policy position that seems to assert that gambling is bad/illegal, except
when it is not.”142 The NYAG has targeted DFS operators for profiting, in
the same way some TFS operators profit, from an activity with at least the
same amount of chance as TFS. Lawmakers and regulators ought to
remove the legally baseless and confusing skill-chance distinction from our
statutes and replace it with language that better articulates societal goals. A
new, more accurate and sensible definition of gambling is badly needed.
One noteworthy suggestion, from the Massachusetts Gaming Commission,
is to define gambling as an “economy activity characterized by a payment
by a player for an opportunity to win an award based on the outcome of a
future event, which is not otherwise regulated.”143

140. Sam is an exaggerated version of Saahil Sud, who was featured in a Bloomberg
Business article on the difficulty of winning money on DFS websites. Brustein, supra note
84.
141. 31 U.S.C. § 5362((1)(A)(II) (“[A]ll winning outcomes” must “reflect the relative
knowledge and skill of the participants.”) (emphasis added).
142. MA White Paper, supra note 133, at 19.
143. Id.
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Such an overhaul of our statutes nationwide will undoubtedly take a
lengthy period of time, during which millions of fantasy sports enthusiasts
will be left in legal limbo. Congress could mediate this issue by enacting a
clear and broad carve-out for fantasy sports up to a certain dollar amount
per person, much like the IGBA left “kitchen table” poker alone but
criminalized commercial poker providers.144 Such a statute would offer
much needed clarity and protection to players of fantasy sports, while
allowing individual states to regulate the business of fantasy sports as they
see fit. Massachusetts regulators, for example, have expressed interest in
exploring various consumer protection measures but otherwise allowing
large operations like FanDuel and DraftKings.145
The NYAG echoes many Americans by arguing TFS are not a
seriously questioned activity.146 As the legal analysis section of this
comment demonstrates, the unquestioned status of TFS is not because our
laws make it unequivocally legal, but rather because it has been popularly
accepted as part of American culture. If this behavior is indeed condoned,
Congress ought to pass a federal statute explicitly condoning it and setting
clear parameters, rather than leaving millions of fans and a sizable part of
our economy exposed to the whims of local prosecutors.
CONCLUSION
Fantasy sports, particularly DFS, are a relatively new phenomenon
that our current laws do not adequately address. The failed New York
Insider Trading investigation and the unclear status of TFS and DFS under
our federal and state laws reveal that this area of social and economic
activity requires regulatory attention. Legislators ought to consider moving
away from a skill-chance distinction and towards a more uniform federal
law in order to reflect societal values accurately and provide protection and
legal predictability to millions of Americans.

144. “The intent of . . . [the IGBA] is not to bring all illegal gambling activity within the
control of the federal government, but to deal only with illegal gambling activity of major
proportions.” H.R. REP. 91-1549, at 53 (1970).
145. See generally MA White Paper, supra note 133 (pointing out issues such as age
verification, funds protection and game integrity as areas of concern).
146. Cease & Desist Letter, supra note 89.

